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INDETERMINACY AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
FrederickMark Gedicks*
Since Professor Greenawalt criticizes my own approach to
the religion clauses (pp. 434-39),' I will focus my comments
there. Professor Greenawalt fairly summarizes my position as
follows:
Professor Gedicks's main thesis is that the Supreme Court's
dominant "discourse" has been "secular" and "individualist,"
but that many of its decisions can be adequately explained
only by an older "religious communitarian" discourse that allows governments to exercise their power to encourage people to accept the foundational morality of conservative religion. Gedicks concludes that were the Supreme Court to make
the doctrinal changes that would render the law of the religion clauses "a coherent expression of secular individualism,"
that would be highly unpopular. And, at this stage in the
country's history, "[r]eligious communitarian discourse is not
a viable alternative to secular individualism." The Court cannot develop a compromise position because the two discourses are "mutually exclusive." (p. 435) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).2
Conceding that this is an accurate summation of the conceptual incoherence of establishment clause jurisprudence,
Greenawalt nevertheless argues that some viable discourse
might yet emerge if courts were more transparent about how
they weigh conflicting establishment clause values (p. 436). This
seems unlikely. There's little evidence that the pockets of coherence that periodically appear in establishment clause doctrine
are anything more than way stations on a road to nowhere.

* Visiting Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School: Guy Anderson Chair &
Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School; gedicksf@law.byu.edu.
1. Discussing FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND
STATE (1995).
2. Quoting id. at 11, 121,123.
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Take, for example, "neutrality" analysis of financial aid to
religion under the establishment clause. So long as financial aid
to religion is disbursed directly to individuals who have qualified
on the basis of religiously neutral criteria, such aid does not violate the establishment clause.' Indeed, it was widely thought that
denying such aid under these circumstances amounted to impermissible discrimination against religion.
Enter Locke v. Davey,4 which reviewed the constitutionality
of a state-funded scholarship program that uses religiously neutral criteria to fund the college education of individual college
students, unless they're studying for the ministry. It's hard to see
this refusal as anything but a religious classification deployed
precisely to deny a state financial benefit to students whose
study, we may safely assume, is a "religious" activity. Nevertheless, the Court found that this denial was permitted by the "play
in the joints" of the superstructure that connects the establishment clause with the free exercise clause Ironically, this same
looseness permits the Court to lean in the opposite direction,
when it is so inclined, as when it rejected an establishment clause
challenge to prayers offered by denominational ministers at the
opening of a state legislative session.6 Like the joints of an old
rocking chair, these connections are so loose that they leave
room for state action that purposefully advantages or disadvantages particular religious activities without somehow violating
the antidiscrimination principles of either religion clause.
At present, the religious antidiscrimination principle under
the establishment clause is that a state cannot advantage or disadvantage religious practice by the use of religious classifications... except when it can. To sum up the financial aid cases,
states may not depart from religious neutrality by employing religious classifications that deny state benefits to believers, except
when the benefit is not too big and disallowing it would be historically incongruous or politically controversial, even though
the state may grant a similar benefit, if disallowing this other
benefit would likewise be historically incongruous and politically
controversial, because a core historical purpose of the establish-

3.
U.S. 793
4.
5.
6.

E.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530
(2000) (plurality opinion).
540 U.S. 712 (2004).
Id. at 718-19.
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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ment clause is to prevent state support of ministers, except
sometimes.7 God bless America.
Which brings us to the other major doctrinal vein of the establishment clause, cases involving government adoption of religious symbols or practices. The rule here initially required that
the states be 8neutral or even-handed between "religion" and
"non-religion," which logically meant that the states could not
use any symbols or practices, or must use all symbols and practices. The former is impossible, while the latter is, well, really
impossible. Or maybe it's the other way around.
The Court slipped this trap by assuming that sometimes religious symbols used by the states mean nothing. Happily, the
states are not required to be neutral among religiously meaningless symbols. Less happily, the same symbol can be both meaningful and meaningless. How to tell the difference? (Paging Justice O'Connor.)
The Court has answered this question in a line of cases that
starts with Christmas Nativity scenes, and rests for the moment
with monuments of-or is it to?-the Ten Commandments,
while waiting for the arrival of the Pledge of Allegiance. The
rule that has emerged requires a suspension of common sense,
rather like rational basis review: If one can construct some imaginable basis for arguing that a religious symbol is not really religious, then its deployment by the state doesn't violate the establishment clause, even when it's obvious that the symbol in fact
retains substantial religious content. Thus has a Nativity scene
commemorating the virgin birth of the Christian savior been reduced to the commercialism of the candy canes that surrounded
it,9 a minor Jewish holiday inflated to the theological significance
of the most important Christian holiday," the Ten Commandments incorporated into the "our nation's heritage,"" and, in a
preview of the Pledge, "under God" transformed into an histori-

7. A new AALS "best-practices" gloss on academic freedom prohibits law professors who defend this rule from criticizing Governor Palin's syntax. Ha, just kidding. Sort
of.
8. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
9. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
10. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 617 (plurality opinion); id. at 633 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
11. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683, 687, 688 (2005).
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cal marker of more pious days gone by. 2 As statements of cultural fact these holdings are all, shall we say, slightly off the
mark. 3
To sum up, the Court has clearly stated that the states may
not adopt religious symbols or practices, except in contexts
where one might plausibly imagine that the symbols have lost
their religious content, even when it's apparent that the symbols
remain religiously potent, which would seem to make the purportedly plausible loss of symbolic religious content implausible,
but never mind.
Professor Greenawalt eventually retreats to the familiar last
refuge of doctrinal coherentists, "hard cases make bad law,"
suggesting that cases requiring difficult line-drawing at the margin of a rule should not be taken to undermine the essential stability of the paradigm situations governed by the rule's core
meaning (pp. 437-38). The peculiarities of the Court's financial
aid and religious symbol and practice cases, however, do not
stem from unusual fact situations whose problematic resolution
at the margins has left undisturbed some stable central meaning.
In both lines of cases, the inconsistencies go directly to those
supposedly stable cores. In Locke, for example, there is no serious question that the ministerial scholarship applicant was otherwise fully qualified to receive the scholarship, that a religious
classification was used to deny him the scholarship, and that the
applicant thus suffered targeted religious discrimination by the
state. These considerations go directly to what was thought to be
the core meaning of both religion clauses-that states may not
purposefully disadvantage citizens on the basis of their religious
beliefs or practices. In the religious symbol and practice cases,
one can imagine situations in which a once-religious symbol truly
retains no appreciable religious significance - a Christmas tree
might be an apt example. But there remains no serious question
that Christian Nativity scenes and monuments to quotations
from the most theologically conservative Protestant Bible are
authentically religious symbols, regardless of who or what may
be loitering in the vicinity. The only way for the Court to avoid
12. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26 (2004) (Rhenquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment).
13. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: JudeoChristianityand the Ten Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 289-304 (2007) (demonstrating the sectarian Christian meanings projected by monuments to the Ten Commandments and other purportedly inclusive religious symbols).
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the core establishment clause rule that government may not endorse or prefer one religion above another is to adopt the fiction
that these religious symbols are not religious.
Sense can be made of both lines of cases, however, by looking at them as the interplay of a "religious communitarian" discourse that understands the United States as a (theologically
conservative) Christian nation that merely tolerates religious difference, and a secular individualist discourse that understands
religious belief as just another taste or preference about which
the state should express no opinion. l' Religious communitarianism became the dominant discourse in the United States in the
early 19th century, and it has remained culturally potent even as
its conceptual foundations have been eroded by decades of secular individualist religion clause holdings. Religious communitarianism accounts for both the Court's move to neutrality in the financial aid cases, and its refusal to invalidate state appropriation
of obvious religious symbols despite the supposed constitutional
rule that bans state endorsements of religion. Secular individualism was present at the founding and also retains its potency,
which accounts for the Court's visceral invalidation of what
should have been a paradigm application of religious neutrality
in Locke, and its invalidations of state-adopted religious symbols
when a rational basis for religious meaninglessness cannot be
imagined.
Professor Greenawalt accurately notes my skepticism about
the determinacy of language in general, and legal reasoning in
particular, labeling this a dramatic overstatement (p. 437).15
Whether that's an overstatement is an argument for another day.
What is clear today is the apparent stability at the surface of establishment clause doctrine belies the indeterminacy that's lurking just beneath, waiting for the case that upsets everything.
Locke and Van Orden functioned in precisely this manner, unexpectedly decentering apparently stable doctrinal resolutions.
On this score, the safer bet is that incoherence in establishment
clause doctrine is the rule rather than its exception.

14.
15.

See GEDICKS,supra note 1.
Quoting GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 45.

